In this paper I examine how the protection of creditors' rights influence the way in which foreign bank entry affects the access to credit of firms. Using a sample of more than 6000 firms in 22 transition countries I find that as bankruptcy proceedings become more inefficient foreign bank entry is more likely to crowd-out small and opaque firms. Conversely, as the protection of creditors' rights improve, the positive association between foreign banks and firms' credit constraints diminishes. These results are robust to controls for endogeneity of foreign banks. The interaction of foreign banks and the protection of creditors rights would explain the disparity of results obtained by previous studies: In countries with an adequate protection of creditor rights foreign bank entry may benefit all firms; By contrast, in countries with weak protection of creditor rights foreign bank entry is likely to result in a credit crunch.
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Introduction
In the late 1990s many developing countries opened up their financial sectors to foreign bank entry. Advocates of liberalisation prognosticated more stable and deeper financial systems thanks to technological transfers, access to better know-how and increased competition. Detractors, pointed at the possibility of cream skimming by foreign banks and, as a consequence, at a possible credit rationing of small and medium enterprises (SMEs). The financial stability enjoyed by most countries in the last decade has largely given right to financial liberalisation advocates. The jury is still out, however, with respect to the impact of foreign banks on credit access. More than ten years since the first reformers opened up their markets we have now enough data to address this issue.
The possibility that foreign bank entry may lead to credit rationing stems from information asymmetries and adverse selection costs. If information is complete, foreign bank entry should result in more and cheaper loans as inefficient credit providers are replaced by more efficient banks. But if information is costly foreign banks may only be able to serve a segment of firms. With market segmentation the net impact of foreign bank entry on total credit growth and on credit allocation becomes difficult to predict.
Yet, surprisingly enough, very little is known about the impact of foreign banks in countries with poor economic institutions, where information asymmetries can be expected to be acute. As growing numbers of developing countries with relatively weak economic institutions turn to foreign banks to strengthen their financial sectors, understanding the linkages between institutional development and financial intermediation is of more than mere theoretical interest. This paper contributes to this debate by relating economic institutions to the net impact of foreign banks on credit access, using firm-level information in 22 transition economies. In particular, I test whether the interaction between the protection of creditor's rights and the share of foreign banks in the domestic financial sector has a significant effect on the access to and the costs of credit of SMEs. To my knowledge this is the first time that this relation is empirically addressed at the firm level.
I find that in transition countries foreign bank entry has resulted in more, rather than in fewer, credit constraints for the average firm. Rather than benefiting the majority of firms, as has apparently been the case in middle income countries, in transition economies only the most transparent firms, i.e. firms that use international accounting standards, benefit from foreign bank entry.
The negative impact of foreign banks on the vast majority of firms in this sample is associated to weaknesses in the bankruptcy systems of transition countries. As bankruptcy proceedings become lengthier and more expensive, the negative incidence of foreign banks on credit conditions increases. These results are robust to controls for the possible endogeneity of foreign banks.
For developing countries these findings hold an important warning. In these countries many of the expected benefits of foreign bank entry may not materialise before legal reform achieves a certain threshold.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Part two motivates the study and reviews the literature on foreign banks and credit access of small firms. Part three presents the empirical set up and results. Part four concludes.
Motivation and literature review
At the theoretical level, a vast body of literature explores the effect of foreign bank entry on total credit growth and credit allocation in the presence of information asymmetries (see Clarke, G. et. al. 2001b for a comprehensive literature review). The main insight of this literature may be summarised as follows: If markets are complete, financial liberalisation, by allowing the operation of more efficient banks in the home market, should result in deeper financial sectors and better credit allocation. In the presence of information asymmetries, however, this result may no longer hold. If foreign banks only have a comparative advantage in serving some borrowers, their entry may lead to market segmentation with ambiguous effects on total credit growth and credit allocation.
The literature on information and credit allocation typically distinguishes between two types of information (e.g Berger and Udell, 2002 , Degryse and Ongena, 2005 : Hard information, such as balance sheets that comply with some minimum accounting standards, and soft information which refers to information more difficult to encode, such as the trustworthiness of potential borrowers. Hard information can be presented in standardised ways and therefore travels easily across the different organisational layers within a bank, irrespective of the distance between the person who gathers this information (the loan officer) and the person that approves the transaction (management). The transmission of soft information, by contrasts, requires a more involved interaction between loan officers and management and suffers, therefore, when the distance between these two instances in the decision-making process increases.
In markets where soft information is needed to sort out clients, small banks enjoy a natural advantage over larger and more hierarchical institutions. In the case of foreign banks, which also tend to be large and hierarchical firms, and where management and loan officers are physically located in different countries, cultural differences make the flow of soft information even more difficult. Thus foreign banks can be expected to concentrate on those segments of the market where hard information is readily available, such as large corporations or the government, and to leave small/opaque firms to local lenders.
. Empirical evidence has shown that, relative to domestic banks, foreign bank portfolios do indeed attach more weight to wholesale banking and give more credit to large borrowers, leaving local banks to retail banking and to look after lending to small firms (see Focarelli and Pozzolo, 2000) . 
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To policy makers this peculiarity of the banking industry poses an important question.
If it is possible that foreign bank entry has a different impact on firms of different types, is it likely to be detrimental to the smaller and less transparent firms?
Theoretically, a foreign bank bias towards hard information firms does not necessarily imply that opaque firms will definitely encounter higher credit constraints after liberalisation, as compared with their previous situation. Under certain conditions, domestic banks may profitably specialise in serving the more opaque group of firms, so that, after liberalisation, this sector may -at least -not be worse off than before.
Allowing for technical spillovers and an increase in competition among domestic banks for these borrowers, access to credit may even improve.
Under which circumstances can good but opaque firms be expected to gain or lose from foreign bank entry? In a recent contribution to this debate, Detragiache E., P.
Gupta and Th. Tressel(2006) offer a model that shows that, when adverse selection costs and the costs of monitoring soft information firms are sufficiently large relative to the return from projects, foreign bank entry can lead to less total lending, as opaque firms are completely left out of the financial circuit.
In this set up, two banks, a foreign and a domestic bank with two different monitoring technologies, compete for borrowers. The costs of monitoring hard information are lower for the foreign bank, whereas the domestic bank has a competitive advantage in monitoring soft information firms. The comparative advantage of the foreign bank in monitoring hard information allows it to offer lower interest rates to firms that can provide this type of information which, therefore, sort themselves out. Once the foreign bank has won all good hard information projects the domestic bank is left with a new pool that encompasses all soft information projects plus all bad projects rejected by the foreign bank.
If before foreign bank entry the domestic bank was pooling all projects and lending at a rate r p , foreign bank entry will alter lending rates to opaque firms in one of three possible ways: 5 1) If the costs of monitoring soft information are high relative to the costs of adverse selection (the costs to good opaque projects of being pooled with bad projects) the domestic bank will pool together bad projects and good but opaque projects and continue financing albeit at a rate r p * > r p .
2) If the costs of monitoring soft information are lower than the costs of adverse selection the domestic bank will separate good opaque projects and finance them at a rate r s =1+C s such that r p * > r s > r p where C s is the domestic bank's cost of monitoring soft information. Bad projects will not be financed.
3) If the costs of monitoring soft information and the costs of adverse selection are very high the domestic bank will stop all lending and credit rationing will ensue.
If the domestic bank was separating hard and soft information projects before foreign bank entry will only affect hard information firms which will face lower rates.
Thus in this set up only hard information firms can benefit from foreign bank entry whereas soft information firms can never be better off: For soft information firms the impact of foreign banks can only run from irrelevant, if a separated equilibrium existed before foreign bank entry, to credit rationing if adverse selection and monitoring costs are very high 1 .
In twofold: First, the foreign bank bias against small/opaque firms will be greater in countries where risky lending is particularly costly. Second, in these countries the moral hazard attached to the pool of projects not served by foreign banks will also be larger. In these conditions domestic banks willing to serve opaque clients will only be able to do it at significantly higher interest rates, if at all. This paper tests this hypothesis relating institutions to the net impact of foreign banks on credit access using information on institutional development and credit access of firms in transition economies. To my knowledge, this is the first time that this relation is empirically tested.
Based on this discussion I set to answer these two related questions: Second, while other data bases rely on information provided by firms that submit financial data to local authorities (i.e. hard information firms), firms in the BEEPS sample were randomly selected from business directories and yellow pages. These two features ensure the inclusion in the sample of small and opaque firms; Third, BEEPS includes both firms with and without credit, allowing the direct observation of the extent of credit supply constraints.
This last feature of the data makes this paper especial among other studies of credit in transition countries (e.g Gianetti and Ongeny, forthcoming, Bonin 2001 , or de Haas 2005 in that the focus here are the losers rather than winners of economic reform. Studies based on samples of firms with credit can tell whether different institutions, e.g., different legislation on foreign bank entry, generate -or not-better credit conditions for these firms. What they cannot see, but the present study can, is whether some firms are left out in the cold as a result of the reform.
However it should be noted that, since the data is purely cross-sectional, I cannot estimate the impact of foreign banks on credit access over time. Credit rationing can arise if foreign banks have difficulties screening borrowers, and local banks cannot profitably serve those good projects 'wrongly' rejected by the foreign bank. In that sense, foreign bank entry may lead to more credit constraints for opaque firms at an initial date but this bias may become less important over time, as foreign banks acquire the knowledge they require to process soft information and/or firms upgrade their signals. Lacking this time dimension, the terms foreign bank entry, foreign bank ownership and foreign bank presence are used interchangeably.
The sample covers 6.189 firms in the following 22 countries: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Tajikistan and Ukraine.
Dependent variables
BEEPS includes two questions about the impact of credit constraints of firms. The first is whether access to commercial credit constitutes an obstacle to growth. The second is whether the costs of commercial finance constitute an obstacle to growth. Answers to these questions are ordered in an scale of 1 to 4 with 4 signifying that the respective constraint is a major obstacle to growth. Based on these indicators I construct two dummy dependent variables, access to and cost of credit. These two variables take value of one when the corresponding constraint is found to be a major obstacle to growth, and zero otherwise.
In table 1 Regarding bank ownership the table distinguishes between countries where foreign banks dominate (i.e. countries where foreign banks own more than 50% of total banking assets) and the rest.
27% of small firms versus 20% of large firms find that the costs of credit are a major obstacle to growth. This is as expected since small firms are generally found to have more problems acceding credit than large firms. When the proxy for opacity is the narrower definition of 'use of international accounting standards' the difference is even more striking: 26% of opaque firms versus 17% of transparent firms find that the cost of credit is a major obstacle to growth.
Results are more interesting however when the sample is split between countries where foreign banks dominate and the rest. In the first sub sample 30% of all opaque firms versus only 16% of transparent firms find that the costs of credit are a major obstacle to growth. Parson chi2 tests show that these difference are significant at the 1% level of confidence. Similar (albeit not significant) differences are observed between small and large firms: relatively more small firms find that the costs of credit are a major obstacle to growth in countries where foreign banks dominate while the opposite is true for larger firms. Interestingly in terms of access to credit foreign banks seem to punish opaque firms without affecting transparent firms: 12% of transparent firms (15% of large firms) find that access to credit is a major obstacle to growth irrespective of whether these firms are located in countries where foreign banks dominate or not.
By contrast significantly less opaque firms located in countries where domestic banks dominate meet major problems acceding credit (16%) than similar firms operating in countries where foreign banks dominate (24%).
These figures suggest that in these countries cream skimming by foreign banks may be resulting indeed in the type of credit crunches expected by adverse selection models such the Detriagace et.al. model reviewed above. That is, as foreign bank presence increases the likelihood that opaque firms meet greater credit constraints seems to rise.
The next section explores this possibility econometrically.
Estimation of the impact of foreign banks on credit constraints
The point of departure is the estimation of the impact of foreign banks on the probability that firms' growth prospects are compromised by credit constraints. Given the dichotomous character of the dependent variables, the method of estimation is the probit model. The equation estimated is:
where ϕ is the standard normal cumulative distribution This equation states that the probability of firm i in country j being credit constrained depends on firm size, firm transparency, the share of foreign owned banks in the banking sector of country j, and two vectors (Fij and Cj) of other firm and country characteristics that may affect access to credit (All variables and their sources are described in table 2. Basic data is shown on table 3). Adding to 1) the interaction of foreign banks and firm size (transparency) brings into the analysis the marginal impact of foreign banks on credit access of small and opaque firms.
If foreign banks are exogenous in 1) β3 would measure the impact of foreign banks on the credit constraints meet by the average firm the sample. The interaction term foreign banks and firm opacity, in turn, would measure the extent to which foreign bank presence closes or widens the credit gap between small (opaque) and larger (transparent) firms.
Dealing with endogeneity of foreign banks
Foreign banks, however, need not be exogenous in models of credit allocation.
Empirical studies have shown that in developing countries foreign bank entry indeed is closely correlated to the size of the financial sectors and the expected economic growth of host countries. According to Focarelli and Pozzolo (2001) 
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Tables 4 Of the firm control variables, the most important determinants of credit constraints are size, transparency and origin of ownership: Small firms are significantly more likely to find that both access to and the costs of credit are major obstacles to growth, whereas transparent firms and foreign-owned firms are significantly less likely to meet major credit constraints than opaque and domestic-owned firms. Opacity, in other words, or the risk attached to small domestic-owned business that cannot transmit hard information, seems to be the main determinant of credit constraints in this sample, with other variables like profitability or even relations with foreign partners playing no visible role in credit facilitation.
14 The importance of opacity in the determination of credit constraints is also consistent with the negative and significant coefficient obtained for the number of banks operating in the country. In line with the expectation of models of credit with asymmetric information, as the number of banks increases firms are more likely to meet major credit constraints suggesting that the expectation of long relations between banks and borrowers are important facilitators of credit in these countries.
Regarding other country controls, results show that government-owned banks do not alleviate credit access conditions for these firms and that, on the contrary, a higher participation of state-owned banks is associated with more credit constraints, at least when the constraint is measured as access to credit. Finally, inflation and government debt also negatively affect credit access as previous studies of credit in transition countries have shown.
Turning now to foreign bank entry, the variable of interest here, the table shows that as the share of foreign-owned banks increases so does the probability of a firm stating that access to and the cost of credit are major obstacles to growth. The negative impact of foreign banks on credit constraints is very large. The estimated probability of a firm declaring that the costs of credit are a major obstacle to growth jumps from 19%, when the share of foreign banks is 5%, that is in a country like Tajikistan small firms where information asymmetries can be expected to be more acute.
Whereas Clarke et. al use a sample of middle-income countries, with which one may associate relatively higher levels institutional development, the BEEPS sample includes a large number of countries with very low levels of legal creditor protection, corporate governance, and law enforcement. In the case of Giannetti and Ongena, their study is focused on medium and large firms that submit financial data to local authorities and can, therefore, be expected to suffer less from any form of credit rationing derived from opacity. In fact, in line with their results I find that transparent firms do benefit from foreign bank entry. It is opaque firms that suffer. To explore the validity of this assumption the next section brings into the analysis the impact of institutions.
Empirical analysis of institutions
Having established the impact of foreign banks on access to credit the second step is to add to the analysis the influence of economic institutions. The main hurdle to overcome here is to find indicators of specific economic institutions, such as the protection of creditor rights, that are not highly correlated with other macroeconomic and financial sector controls that may also affect credit conditions. This is particularly 
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Results of estimations with institutional variables are presented in tables 8 a) and b)-.
In line with results by previous studies I find a direct and important impact of economic institutions on credit constraints. These results are particularly clear in the equation for costs of credit. In this case, when either the costs of bankruptcy proceedings or the time to complete the proceedings increase, so does the likelihood that firms meet major credit constraints. And the effect is not negligible: As shown in the lower panel of table8 a) a reduction in the costs of proceedings from 42% of the estate, as is the case in Ukraine, to 13%, as is the case in a country like Latvia, would reduce the probability that an Ukrainian firm meets major credit constraints in the costs of credit from 45% to 22%. Similarly if the time to complete proceedings were to be reduced from 5.8 years, as is the case today in Belarus, to 2.8 as is the case in Moldova, the probability that a firm in Belarus meets major credit constraints would fall from 42% to 23%. These are major gains. Or, put differently: Firms in transition countries are paying a high price for the inefficiencies in these countries' bankruptcy systems. foreign banks and the costs of bankruptcy proceedings and between foreign banks and the time to complete proceedings. In the case of the costs of credit both interaction terms are positive and significant for all observation in the sample. In other words, inefficiencies in bankruptcy proceedings not only have a direct negative impact on credit access, they also affect firms through their interaction with foreign banks. As bankruptcy proceedings become lengthier and more costly, the negative impact of foreign banks on the costs of credit becomes more pronounced. In the case of access to credit, institutional variables appear to be of lesser importance. 4 The coefficients of the probit interaction terms were corrected with the Norton's 'inteff' estimation procedure for STATA.
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Conclusions
The main contribution of this paper is the analysis of the influence of economic institutions on the effect of foreign banks on credit access. Working on a sample of mainly small and opaque firms in 22 transition economies I find that in these countries only very transparent firms have benefited from foreign bank entry. For large numbers of small and opaque firms foreign bank entry has resulted in less and more costly commercial loans. I present strong evidence that these results can be explained by the type of economic institutions that prevail in these countries. In particular, I show that the negative impact of foreign banks on the costs of credit increases significantly with the worsening of the legal environment, characterised by lengthy and expensive bankruptcy proceedings.
These results suggest that pooling data of countries with different legal environments can be misleading. What obtains for rich and middle income countries, with presumably better legal systems, does not necessarily apply to low income countries where economic institutions are weaker.
For poor countries, the policy implications of these results are important.
Strengthening the financial sector via foreign bank entry is likely to be harmful to large numbers of firms if it is not accompanied by the required upgrading of their legal systems. Small firms are firms of less than 50 employees. Transparent firms are firms with international accounting standards. Countries where foreign banks dominate are those where foreign banks own more than 50% of bank assets. 
Firm-level controls
Profitability
Ratio of gross profits to total sales in 1998/1999. (-) 
BEEPS
Foreign-owned firm
